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Abstract
The paper combines optimal taxation theory with human capital the-
ory and develops a theoretical model with endogenous wages and edu-
cation decision, in which redistributive policy experiments are carried
out and assessed. It is argued that general equilibrium eﬀects of labor
income taxation on wages may counteract ﬁscal redistribution. It is
also shown that education subsidies may only beneﬁt skilled workers,
suggesting that this subsidy can merely be viewed as a redistribution
from unskilled to skilled individuals. Therefore, optimal policy in-
volves a lump-sum education tax in the form of a negative education
subsidy.
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To which extent should labor income be redistributed? And what are the
consequences for the economy? These questions have been on the research
agenda ever since the minimum sacriﬁce theory was introduced by Adam
Smith and John Stuart Mill, and later on by Edgeworth and Pigou1. The
theory suggested that after-tax incomes should be completely equalized, if
marginal utility of consumption is decreasing. This reasoning does not take
into account the disincentive eﬀect of taxation on labor supply decisions,
which creates a trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency considerations. Start-
ing with the Nobel Prize winning paper by Mirrlees (1971) and later on
Sheshinski (1972), the recognition of these distortive eﬀects has been a com-
mon assumption. In those analyses, the production side of the economy only
involves one type of labor. This implies that the redistribution achieved goes
entirely through the ﬁscal system. Later contributions, initiated by Feld-
stein (1973) and Allen (1981), explore the situation with two complementary
production factors, skilled and unskilled labor. Wages are endogenously de-
termined in the model and depend on the relative labor supply of the two
types2.
Redistributive linear income taxation will in many cases reduce labor
supply less for skilled workers than for unskilled workers since the income
eﬀects go in diﬀerent directions3. Feldstein (1973) showed that this increase
in the relative labor supply of skilled workers tends to wage convergence
between the two types. Therefore, the general equilibrium eﬀects of labor
supplies on wage rates reinforce the redistribution via the ﬁscal system. This
1See Atkinson (1973) for an overview.
2In Fair (1971) and Atkinson (1973), the distribution of skill types does not inﬂuence
the individuals’ wage rates although there is a continuum of skill types.
3This is due to the fact that skilled individuals (who are also assumed to be high
income earners) being net contributors to the tax and transfer system, whereas unskilled
individuals (low income earners) are net recipients. Thus, their income eﬀects should be
of opposite signs, implying the total eﬀect on their labor supply to generally diﬀer.
2result was scrutinized by Allen (1981) in a more ﬂexible model. He found that
under speciﬁc assumptions on the production function and the labor supply
elasticities4, redistribution via the ﬁscal system and the general equilibrium
eﬀects on wages may also be counteracting.
Instead of relying on assumptions on the production and labor supply
function that are empirically doubtful, I argue that the wage eﬀect rein-
forcing the ﬁscal redistribution in Feldstein (1973) may be counteracted by
distortive eﬀects of redistribution on education decisions. The reason is that
redistribution makes it more attractive to remain an unskilled worker and
less attractive to become a skilled worker. Thus, the share of skilled work-
ers decreases. This tends to wage divergence between skilled and unskilled
workers, since skilled labor is then relatively more scarce. The eﬀect of re-
distribution on the wage rates thus depends on the relative strength of the
wage converging eﬀect caused by the change in relative labor supply per in-
dividual type, and the wage diverging eﬀect caused by a lower share of skilled
workers. Therefore, it is not clear whether ﬁscal redistribution is reinforced
or counteracted by the diﬀerent general equilibrium eﬀects on wage rates.
These two eﬀects were also considered in Wilson (1982), but only one at a
time and not, as in this paper, in combination with each other. Moreover,
that paper focuses on optimal public employment policy and not on the eﬀect
of taxation on wage rates.
Facing the disincentive eﬀect on education investments induced by re-
distribution, many countries strongly subsidize education in order to make
education investments more attractive5. Storesletten and Zilibotti (2000)
suggest that this is the reason why several Western countries with a high
degree of redistribution show a surprisingly good performance when it comes
4In particular, that the elasticity of substitution between the two types of labor is less
than one and either or both of the labor supply elasticities are negative. Note that these
conditions are only necessary and not suﬃcient
5Dur and Teulings (2003) report that education expenditures constitute on average 6
% of GDP in Western countries.
3to enrollment rates to higher education. This is also the theoretical reasoning
in both Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and van Ewijk and Tang (2001).
This paper links together optimal taxation theory and human capital
theory by combining the tax and transfer system and education subsidies.
This was also done in Blankenau (1999) but in that paper, labor supply was
ﬁxed and the policies imposed by the government were assessed one at a time
and not, like in this paper, in combination with each other. Bovenberg and
Jacobs (2005) also consider both education subsidies and transfers, but in
a diﬀerent kind of model. They assume a speciﬁc form of the production
function for human capital and a continuum of skill types. Their result is
that the subsidy rate should equal the tax rate, since this yields eﬃciency in
human capital formation. However, a prerequisite for this result is the as-
sumption of a continuum of education choices. This makes it possible for the
increase of marginal costs of education induced by taxation to exactly can-
cel the eﬀect of higher marginal beneﬁts of education induced by education
subsidies. Moreover, they assume wages not to depend on the relative labor
supply of diﬀerent types, as they do in the model in this paper. Instead, the
wage rate for an individual only depends on her innate ability and her own
education time.
Another related model is Dur and Teulings (2003). They argue that
education subsidies boost education investments and thereby the supply of
skilled workers, which decreases the return to education and increases the
relative wage of unskilled workers. Wages depend (negatively) on the mean
level of human capital among workers and (positively) on their own human
capital, not on the relative labor supply of diﬀerent skill types as in the
model in this paper. They seem to have empirical support for a negative
correlation between the return to education and the mean level of human
capital. However, a closer look at the data suggests that the US does not ﬁt
into the overall picture, with its high mean human capital level and relatively
high returns to education. A plausible explanation for this might be that
4education subsidies in the US are targeted to highly educated individuals,
thus increasing the mean level of human capital while maintaining a relatively
high return to education investments. Like Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005, they
also make assumptions about the wage function with an unclear relationship
to the aggregate production function. Brett and Weymark (2003) and Cremer
et al. (2005) also consider the combination of optimal taxation theory and
human capital theory but in models very diﬀerent from that in this paper.
This paper takes its starting point in ﬁrst principles. The general equilib-
rium model with linear income taxation generalizes Feldstein (1973) in two
ways. First, I use general utility and production functions in the theoretical
part. Second, I endogenize the education decision by the individuals and
hence, also the resulting shares of skilled and unskilled workers. This is done
by letting individuals, heterogeneous in ability, choose between two diﬀerent
education levels, with two diﬀerent wage rates. As explained above, endog-
enizing the skill distribution in the work force will have an additional eﬀect
of government intervention on the wage rates, besides the eﬀect via labor
supply reactions per individual of each type. By assuming that the educa-
tion cost decreases with ability, there will be a threshold ability level, which
separates skilled from unskilled workers. In the theoretical part, I explore
qualitative eﬀects of diﬀerent policy mixes. This is followed by simulations
under realistic assumptions of the production function and labor supply be-
havior and assessment of the optimal policy mix. Although interesting, the
model abstracts from the possibility of complementarity between ability and
education6, and the linkage between incentives to work and invest in human
capital7.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present
the model and characterize the laissez-faire equilibrium. This is followed by
performing comparative statics on the laissez-faire equilibrium in Section 3.
6See, for example, Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Dur and Teulings (2003).
7See Trostel and Walker (2000).
5Then, in Section 4, I carry out simulations and present the main results. A
brief discussion and conclusions are oﬀered in Section 5.
2 The Model
2.1 The laissez-faire economy
Consider a model with a continuum of individuals uniformly distributed over
an inability endowment X ∈ [0,1]8, where a low value of X indicates high
ability and a high value indicates low ability. Population size is normalized
to one. There are two types of jobs in the economy, one advanced, which
requires skilled workers and one less advanced where unskilled and high-
skilled workers are equally productive. The individuals are all unskilled ex
ante education, and simultaneously decide whether to get an education and
thereby become skilled workers or remain unskilled9. The individuals possess
no endowments but a unit of time to be allocated between labor and leisure.
Education is assumed not to be time consuming. All individuals are capable
of getting an education and becoming a skilled worker, but they diﬀer in
how costly this investment is for them in terms of eﬀort required. Costs such
as foregone labor income and tuition fees are not included in the education
cost. Hence, this cost could be viewed as a pure utility loss of eﬀort. The cost
function is c = c(X), with properties c
0 > 0 and c(0) = 0. Let u and s in-
dicate unskilled and skilled workers, respectively. The wage rates, which are
assumed to be equal to the marginal product, are wu and ws, with wu < ws.
Labor supplies are Lu(wu) and Ls(ws), which are increasing in the wage rate.
The aggregate production function is continuously diﬀerentiable, concave in
8This setting allows the threshold value of X to indicate the share of high-skilled
workers, on which the discussion in the paper is highly centered.
9Hence, this is in contrast with Spence (1973), where the skill distribution ex ante and
ex post education was identical and the purpose of education was merely to signal high
ability. Thus, my approach shares the more optimistic view that education is, in fact, skill
improving.
6both arguments and exhibits constant returns to scale. It is written
Y = Y (xLs,(1 − x)Lu) (2.1)
with x indicating the share of skilled workers10 in equilibrium. Due to the

























The maximization problem includes two stages. First, individuals decide
whether to remain an unskilled worker or to get an education and thereby
become a skilled worker. After having made the education decision, both
types of workers maximize their utility by choosing the labor supply maxi-
mizing a continuously diﬀerentiable and concave utility function
10Since inability is uniformly distributed, the individual with X such that she is indif-
ferent between becoming a skilled or an unskilled worker also indicates the share of skilled
workers, whereas 1 − X is the share of unskilled workers.
11See any standard textbook for the derivations of the second equalities in equations
(2.2) and (2.3), for example Romer (1996).
7Uu = u(Cu,Fu) (2.4)
for unskilled individuals and
Us = u(Cs,Fs) − c(X) (2.5)
for skilled individuals, where Cu = wuLu is consumption12 for an individual
of type u, and Fu = 1 − Lu, is leisure time for type u. Analogous notation
holds for workers of type s. I assume separability between the consumption-
leisure complex and the education cost in the utility function, which implies
that the education cost does not aﬀect the labor-leisure decision13. Assuming





12The price of the composite consumption good is normalized to 1.
13This facilitates the computations considerably when performing comparative statics
on the equilibrium in Section 3, since labor supply would otherwise be diﬀerent for every
skilled worker. In the appendix, simulations are made assuming that the education cost
enters the individuals’ budget constraint. The main results remain unaltered from the




2.2 Characterizing the laissez-faire equilibrium
An equilibrium of the model is an allocation V = {wu,ws,Lu,Ls,x} such
that equations (2.2), (2.3), (2.6), (2.7) and
u(Cs,Fs) − c(X) = u(Cu,Fu) (2.8)
hold for the indiﬀerent individual. Furthermore,
1. For all individuals with X < x,
u(Cs,Fs) − c(X) > u(Cu,Fu),
so these individuals optimally decide to get educated and then choose labor
supply Ls and receive wage rate ws.
2. For all individuals with X > x,
u(Cs,Fs) − c(X) < u(Cu,Fu),
so these individuals optimally decide not to get educated and then choose
labor supply Lu and receive wage rate wu.
The equilibrium is found by solving the typically nonlinear system of equa-
tions E = {2.2,2.3,2.6,2.7,2.8} for the vector of variables V .
9Proposition 1
If c(1) is such that u(Cs,Fs)−c(1) < u(Cu,Fu), there exists a X = x ∈ (0,1)
such that E has a solution. Furthermore, the equilibrium is unique.
Proof : Follows from the property that c(X) is monotonically increasing and
that c(0) = 0.￿
3 Comparative statics
If, for equity reasons, the government is not satisﬁed with the outcome of
the laissez-faire economy, it can alter the equilibrium using its policy tools.
That is, it can collect money using a linear tax14 on labor income and use
the revenues to distribute lump-sum transfers and subsidize education. The
analysis will ﬁrst be done assuming exogenous wage rates, so that ﬁscal
redistribution could not be reinforced/counteracted by changes in the wage
rates. Thereafter, endogenous wages are incorporated in the model and its
inﬂuence on the equilibrium is assessed.
Before performing the policy experiments outlined above, the utility level
of the two types needs to be clariﬁed. Whereas unskilled workers have the
same utility, the diﬀerent education cost implies the skilled workers to have
diﬀerent utility levels. Therefore, if a policy change increases the utility for
unskilled workers and decreases that of skilled workers, this is not true for
all switchers, i.e. the individuals that would have chosen to become skilled
workers ex ante the policy change but who choose to remain unskilled ex
post. In this group, there are both individuals that are better oﬀ from the
policy change and those who are worse oﬀ. The situation can be illustrated
by ﬁgure 1:
14The analysis could also be done with lump-sum taxation, but this would make it more
diﬃcult to relate the results to earlier studies.


















The continuous line represents the utility levels for all individuals X ∈ [0,1]
ex ante the policy change. The individual with the highest ability, that is
X = 0, gets utility U0
s and the one with X = x is the indiﬀerent individual
with utility Ux
s = Uu. Ex post the policy change, the utility levels are repre-
sented by the dotted line. The share of skilled workers has decreased to x
0,
the utility for the highest ability individual to U0
0
s and that for the indiﬀerent




s . Note that the indiﬀerent individual
is not the same as ex ante the policy change. When comparing the ex post
and ex ante utility levels, it is clear that 1) the individuals that are skilled
(unskilled) both ex ante and ex post the policy change are worse (better) oﬀ
by the policy change and 2) in the switcher group, there are some individuals
that are worse oﬀ (X ∈ [x
0, ¯ x]), and some that are better oﬀ (X ∈ [¯ x,x]).
For this reason, it is not completely correct to assess the impact of a policy
change in terms of diﬀerences in utilities for the two types exclusively, as will
be done in the rest of the paper. However, it seems to be the best way of
proceeding in order to keep clearness and lucidness.
113.1 Exogenous wage rates
Introducing a linear labor income tax t used to ﬁnance equally large trans-
fers T to all individuals and a subsidy S15 to those that choose to get an
education, the consumption of the two types now becomes Cu = ωuLu + T
and Cs = ωsLs + T + S, where ωu = (1 − t)wu and ωs = (1 − t)ws are the
after tax wage rates. The equilibrium equations are the following:





1 = f2 < 0 (3.2)




1 = g2 < 0 (3.3)
c(x) = u(ωsLs + T + S,1 − Ls) − u(ωuLu + T,1 − Lu) (3.4)
where se and ie indicate substitution eﬀect and income eﬀect, respectively,
and the income eﬀects are assumed to be negative. In this equation system,
T, Lu Ls and x are the endogenous variables, wu and ws are exogenous and t
and S are the policy variables that the government possesses. Equation (3.1)
is the government budget constraint, with expenditures on the left-hand side
and revenues on the right-hand side. Labor supplies (3.2) and (3.3) are af-
fected by the after tax wage rate and the transfer size in three ways. The after




1 that increases the individuals’ labor supply when a
tax is introduced. The transfer itself only involves an income eﬀect ∂Cu
∂T dTf2.
These terms represent the Slutsky decomposition of the total eﬀect of the tax
on labor supply. Analogous eﬀects are assumed for skilled workers. Note that
15The main results remain unaltered if the subsidy is instead assumed to be a share of
the total education cost.
12Equation (3.4) is (2.8) rewritten. Diﬀerentiating equations (3.1)-(3.4) using
the fact that dωu = −wudt16, dωs = −wsdt and evaluating the equations at
t = S = 017, the system of equations can now be written in matrix form as:

   

1 0 0 0
−f2 1 0 0
−g2 0 1 0
uCu − uCs ωuuCu − uFu uFs − ωsuCs c
0

   













   

xwsLs + (1 − x)wuLu −x
−fse
1 wu − fie
1 wu 0
−gse
1 ws − gie
1 ws 0
uCswsLs − uCuwuLu uCs








Using the envelope conditions uFu = ωuuCu and uFs = ωsuCs and solving the
matrix equation for the vector {dT,dLu,dLs,dx} yields:
dT = xwsLsdt + (1 − x)wuLudt − xdS (3.6)
dLu = −f
se
1 wudt − f2xdS + f2x(wsLs − wuLu)dt (3.7)
dLs = −g
se
1 wsdt + g2(1 − x)dS + g2(x − 1)(wsLs − wuLu)dt (3.8)
dx =





(wsLs − wuLu)(uCs(x − 1) − uCux)dt + (uCs(1 − x) + uCux)dS
c
0 (3.10)
16dωu = d((1 − t)wu) = dwu − d(twu) = dwu − tdwu − wudt = −wudt where the last
equality follows from the assumption of exogenous wages. An analogous result is obtained
for type s.
17This is done for expositional reasons and in order to get easily interpretable solutions.
In the simulation section, t and S are allowed to take discrete steps.
13Starting with equation (3.10), the right-hand side shows that dx can have ei-
ther sign. At the margin, the share of skilled workers is negatively aﬀected by
taxation but positively aﬀected by education subsidies. Equation (3.9) estab-
lishes the connection between the change in the share of skilled workers and
government policy. Policies that beneﬁt skilled (unskilled) workers increase
(decrease) x whereas those that make skilled (unskilled) workers worse oﬀ
decrease (increase) x. The denominators of equations (3.9) and (3.10) show
that the change in x is smaller at the margin, the steeper is the cost func-
tion. In the case of dx > 0, this is due to the fact that fewer individuals gain
by getting an education for a given change in the utility diﬀerence between
the two types. In the case of dx < 0, the reason is that the education cost
decreases relatively fast with the ability of the individuals. The subsidy only
involves an income eﬀect that decreases the income of unskilled workers and
increases that for skilled workers. Hence, it tends to increase unskilled labor
supply and decrease skilled labor supply. The transfer change dT is posi-
tively aﬀected by taxation and negatively aﬀected by the degree of education
subsidies.
The signs of dLu in (3.7) and dLs in (3.8) are ambiguous. However, the
third term is negative in (3.7) and positive in (3.8). These expressions rep-
resent the total income eﬀect, that is the sum of the income eﬀects from
the tax and the transfer. The diﬀerent signs on the total income eﬀects for
the two types follow from the fact that unskilled workers are net recipients
and skilled workers net contributors to the government. Thus, if dS = 0,
dLu < dLs if the substitution eﬀect is not considerably more negative for
skilled workers18. It is natural to assume that the labor supply in the laissez-
faire economy is higher for skilled than for unskilled workers, since the former
18In the simulations in Section 4, I show that the substitution eﬀects do not outweigh
the diﬀerence in income eﬀects between the two types. Hence, unskilled workers decrease
their labor supply more than skilled workers when the tax is introduced.
14type has a higher wage rate than the latter; i.e., Lu < Ls. If this is the case,
the decrease in labor supply is relatively stronger for unskilled workers, that
is dLu/Lu < dLs/Ls. This is the result that Feldstein (1973) used to argue
for converging wages when income is taxed. However, when dS = 0, equation
(3.10) shows that dx < 0. This makes skilled labor more scarce and therefore
has a wage diverging eﬀect when wages are not ﬁxed. These eﬀects on the
wage rates are discussed in the following section.
3.2 Endogenous wage rates
With endogenous wage rates, the equilibrium equations are now the following:





1 = f2 < 0 (3.12)





















c(x) = u(Cs,Fs) − u(Cu,Fu) (3.16)
Equations (3.14-15) are the new equations as compared to the previous case
with exogenous wages. The wage rates for the two skill types are inversely
related to the total relative labor supply of their own type. In principle, the
system of equations (3.11-16) can be solved for the endogenous variables in
the same way as in the case with exogenous wages, but the solution seems
15diﬃcult to interpret. Therefore, in the following, will only discuss the main
eﬀects of endogenizing the wages. The sign and magnitudes of these eﬀects
are then discussed along with the simulations in the next section. Diﬀeren-

































The diﬀerentiated wage equations (3.17-18) show what should be expected.
The wage rate of the own worker type decreases with the labor supply per
worker of the same type, increases with that of workers of the other type,
and decreases with the share of workers of the same type.
It is interesting to relate wage equations (3.17-18) to the wage equation
in Dur and Teulings (2003). In their paper, the wage equation is w(s,µ) =
wo(µ) + e(−γµ)s, where s is the individual’s human capital level and µ is the
mean level of human capital in the economy. If labor supply were ﬁxed, the
corresponding variable to µ in my paper would be x, that is the share of
skilled workers. The more general formulation of the wage rate in my paper
allows wages to depend not only on the distribution of skill types, but also
on the supply of labor for diﬀerent skill types.
Two main eﬀects for how endogenizing wages aﬀect the equilibrium can
be distinguished. First, labor supplies react when t is changed, which aﬀects
the wage rates and thus, utilities and the shares of the types are also aﬀected.
Second, for a given change in x, wage rates are aﬀected since they are func-
tions of x. These eﬀects are always counteracting the initial change in x. For
example, when dx < 0, skilled workers become relatively more scarce. This
will have a positive eﬀect on skilled workers’ wage rate and a negative eﬀect
16on the wage rate of unskilled workers. This makes it more attractive to be-
come a skilled worker and thus, the drop in x is reduced. It was not possible
to explore these eﬀects in Feldstein (1973) and Allen (1982), since the shares
of skilled and unskilled workers were ﬁxed in their models. As could be seen
in sections 3.1 and 3.2, redistribution through the tax and transfer system
implies two diﬀerent eﬀects on wage rates. First, the relative labor supply
per individual type increases, which has a wage converging eﬀect. Second,
the share of skilled workers decreases, which has a wage diverging eﬀect. Ed-
ucation subsidies have the opposite eﬀect on wages, since they make relative
labor supply decrease and the share of skilled workers increase. The net ef-
fects of this labor supply eﬀect on the one hand and the share eﬀect on the
other hand, can naturally not be assessed analytically. Therefore, they are
now assessed in the next section, using simulations.
4 Simulations
Section 3 examined and described the partial eﬀects on the endogenous vari-
ables that may be generated by government intervention in a laissez-faire
economy. In this section, I use speciﬁc functional forms in order to simulate
the signs and magnitudes of the net eﬀects on these variables. The calcula-
tions were made in Mathematica.
174.1 Simulation Model
u(Cu,Fu) =[φ((1 − t)wuLu + T)




u(Cs,Fs) =[φ((1 − t)wsLs + T + S)




Y =[µ((1 − x)Lu)



















u(Cu,Fu) =u(Cs,Fs) − θx
ξ (4.9)
Equations (4.1-3) assume a CES form of the utility functions for both types
of workers and the aggregate production function. Equation (4.4) is the gov-
ernment budget constraint. Equation (4.9) is the condition for the individual
that is indiﬀerent between remaining unskilled or becoming skilled. I assume
that the cost function enters linearly in that equation, that is ξ = 1. This
assumption is relaxed in the sensitivity analysis. The other parameter values
are chosen in the following way: φ = 0.29, µ = 0.4, γ = 1/3 and β = 0.12, as
in Lundholm and Wijkander (2002). This gives labor supplies in the magni-
tude of 40 hours per week and around 50 per cent higher wages for skilled
than for unskilled workers in the case with no government intervention. θ is
set to 0.0866 for the share of skilled workers to be 50 per cent in the laissez-
18faire equilibrium. This makes the comparisons with the simulation results in
Feldstein (1973) more transparent.
4.2 Results
Table 1: Government policy, wage rates, labor supplies,
transfer size and share of skilled workers
t S wu ws Lu Ls T x
0 0 0.4063 0.5938 0.2423 0.2519 0 0.5000
0.1 0 0.3991 0.6009 0.2155 0.2339 0.0112 0.4781
0.1 0.003 0.4037 0.5964 0.2314 0.232269 0.0098 0.4919
Table 1 shows the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables, for a given
government policy. The laissez-faire equilibrium shows labor supply to be
somewhat larger for skilled workers, and their wage rate to be around 50 per
cent higher than that for unskilled workers.
When the income tax is imposed, labor supplies decrease for both types.
However, it decreases proportionally more for the unskilled type, which is
in line with the theoretical predictions in Section 3. Wages tend to diverge
when the tax is imposed, thus counteracting the ﬁscal redistribution. Thus,
it seems as if the wage converging eﬀect of diﬀerent labor supply responses is
more than outweighed by the wage diverging eﬀect of a lower share of skilled
workers.
Switching a portion of the governments’ tax revenue from ﬁnancing trans-
fers to ﬁnancing an education subsidy yields wage compression between the
two types. Once more, there are two eﬀects working in opposite directions.
19First, the subsidy attracts more individuals to become skilled workers, thus
implying a wage converging eﬀect since unskilled labor becomes more scarce.
Second, the subsidy reduces the labor supply for skilled workers since they
receive higher total transfers than before, and increases that for unskilled
workers since they receive lower total transfers than before. This constitutes
a wage diverging eﬀect between skilled and unskilled workers. Thus, the
wage converging eﬀect of a higher share of skilled workers seems to more
than outweigh the wage diverging eﬀect of diﬀerent labor supply responses.
Table 2: Government
policy and utilities
t S Uu U0
s
0 0 4406 4839
0.1 0 4411 4825
0.1 0.003 4404 4830
Table 2 shows the equilibrium values of the utilities, for the same government
policies as in table 1. The utilities are computed using the equilibrium values
of the variables in equations (4.1-2)19. Apparently, utility for the unskilled
type increases and utility for the skilled worker with highest ability, U0
s,
decreases, when the tax is introduced. The education subsidy increases the
utility for the skilled type and decreases that for the unskilled type. In this
equilibrium, utility is lower for both types as compared to the laissez-faire
case.
19For expositional reasons, the values have been monotonically transformed by multi-
plying them with 104.
204.3 Comparison with Feldstein (1973)
As was presented above, the general equilibrium eﬀects of redistribution on
the wage rates counteract ﬁscal redistribution. This is due to the fact that
the counteracting eﬀect of a lower share of skilled workers, which was ne-
glected in Feldstein (1973), seems to be stronger than the reinforcing eﬀect
of labor supply responses. To highlight the comparison with Feldstein (1973),
I have redone the simulations with the setup of that paper. That is, using a
CES utility function and a Cobb-Douglas production function and the same
parameter values as he used, and introduced heterogeneity in ability and an
endogenous education decision as in my model . It turns out that his results
of wage compression as a consequence of redistribution vanish in most cases.
On the contrary, wages typically diverge with the tax rate, as they do in the
simulations in section 4.2. The setup of Feldstein (1973) was the following:
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21The parameter values were φ = 0.5, γ = 0.67, k0 = 1 and β was set at values
1, 0.01 and −0.5, giving the elasticity of substitution ￿ values 0.5, 0.99 and
2.00, respectively. The following results were obtained20.
Table 3: Eﬀects of taxes on labor supplies
and gross wage rates with ﬁxed x = 0.5
￿ t Ls Lu ws wu
ws
wu
0.50 0 0.54 0.65 0.71 0.29 2.44
0.24 0.53 0.58 0.69 0.31 2.22
0.48 0.50 0.50 0.67 0.33 2.03
0.72 0.45 0.39 0.64 0.36 1.77
0.99 0 0.50 0.50 0.67 0.33 2.03
0.24 0.45 0.41 0.65 0.35 1.85
0.48 0.37 0.30 0.62 0.38 1.63
0.72 0.26 0.17 0.59 0.43 1.37
2.00 0 0.38 0.29 0.61 0.40 1.52
0.24 0.27 0.18 0.59 0.43 1.37
0.48 0.15 0.19 0.57 0.46 1.23
0.72 0.05 0.03 0.55 0.49 1.12
Clearly, wages converge as the tax is increased for all three choices of the
elasticity of substitution between labor and leisure. Now, if the share of
skilled and unskilled workers is endogenized in the same way as in my model,
20This is table 1 in Feldstein (1973).
22the setup becomes:
u(Cu,Fu) =[φ(1 − t)wuLu + T)
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u(Cu,Fu) =u(Cs,Fs) − θx
ξ (4.27)
Using the same parameter values as Feldstein (1973), and letting θ = 0.0866
and ξ = 1 as in my simulations, the following results were obtained:
23Table 4: Eﬀects of taxes on labor supplies
and gross wage rates with endogenized x
￿ t Ls Lu ws wu
ws
wu
0.50 0 0.54 0.65 0.71 0.29 2.45
0.24 0.52 0.59 0.74 0.27 2.74
0.48 0.51 0.51 0.79 0.24 3.29
0.72 0.50 0.39 0.86 0.20 4.30
0.99 0 0.50 0.50 0.72 0.29 2.48
0.24 0.46 0.39 0.74 0.27 2.74
0.48 0.42 0.25 0.77 0.25 3.08
0.72 0.38 0.12 0.78 0.25 3.12
2.00 0 0.42 0.22 0.71 0.29 2.44
0.24 0.33 0.11 0.72 0.28 2.57
0.48 0.24 0.04 0.72 0.29 2.48
0.72 0.14 0.01 0.71 0.29 2.45
Table 4 shows that with an endogenized share of skilled and unskilled workers,
wages between the two types typically diverge with a higher tax rate. Only
for a very high elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure,
￿ = 2, will Feldstein’s results go through for tax changes at some intervals.
Overall, and especially for values of the elasticity of substitution with empir-
ical relevance, endogenizing the shares of skill types contradicts the results
in Feldstein (1973) and supports the simulation results in section 4.2 in this
paper.
244.4 Sensitivity analysis
4.4.1 Parameter values, the cost function and the tax rate
A sensitivity analysis was made by combining diﬀerent sets of parameter val-
ues. Although such operations can never be conclusive, the main results of
the benchmark case seem to hold even with very diﬀerent assumptions on the
parameter values. Wages typically diverge as an income tax is introduced,
counteracting the redistributive ﬁscal eﬀect. Introducing the education sub-
sidy increases the share of skilled workers and also has a converging eﬀect
on wages. Labor supplies are decreasing in the tax rate, with the supply of
unskilled labor reacting more strongly than that of skilled labor. The results
also seem stable to diﬀerent forms of the cost function, for example if the
ability enters the cost function exponentially instead of linearly, that is ξ > 1.
The form of the cost function is essential. The steeper it is around the
equilibrium point of the share of skilled workers, the less will redistribution
aﬀect this share. This is because a relatively steep cost function implies that
additional switchers into education face a relatively high education cost. The
”share eﬀect” on wages turned out to outweigh the labor supply eﬀect in the
previous section. Hence, if the cost function is made suﬃciently steep, this
will no longer be the case. As dx becomes suﬃciently small, the labor supply
eﬀect will outweigh the ”share eﬀect”. As an experiment, I have increased ξ
and adjusted θ for every value such that the shares of workers are always 0.5,
as in the main simulations. In that way, the cost function becomes steeper
pivoting around the point c(0.5) when ξ = 1. It turns out that the labor
supply eﬀect dominates the ”share eﬀect” when ξ > 6.521.
In contrast to the simulation results, in many cases the utility for both
types of workers decreases when income is taxed and this distortion increases
with the tax rate. This is true for letting t > 0.11 in the benchmark case.
The reason for this seems to be the following. The income tax distorts
21The exact number cannot be obtained, but the threshold is somewhere between 6.0
and 6.5.
25the labor-leisure choice in such a way that labor supply is reduced. This
increases leisure time, which has a positive eﬀect on utility. At the same
time, consumption is reduced, which has a negative eﬀect on utility. If the
tax change is inﬁnitely small, as is the case in the theoretical section, these
eﬀects on utility cancel out exactly by its envelope conditions. However, if
the tax increase is discrete and consumption and leisure are complements in
the utility function, this is no longer the case. The negative eﬀect on utility
induced by the decrease in consumption more than outweighs the positive
eﬀect induced by a higher leisure time. When the tax rate is set suﬃciently
high, this distortive eﬀect is so strong that it even outweighs the positive
eﬀect on utility for unskilled individuals induced by the redistribution from
skilled individuals. Thus, utility for both types decreases above this tax level.
4.4.2 Education cost as a money cost
Naturally, the assumption of separability of the education cost in the util-
ity function for skilled workers, equation (2.5), is unrealistic. As described
earlier, it neglects the fact that the education cost includes foregone income,
tuition fees etc. Therefore, as a sensitivity analysis, the separability assump-
tion is dropped in the appendix, where the education cost is now a pure
money cost instead of an eﬀort cost. The main results remain unaltered.
4.5 Optimal policy
This section assesses the question of which policy mix is optimal from soci-













2 is the average utility for skilled workers22 and ψ governs
the eﬃciency-equity trade-oﬀ. Note that this function only considers equity
between, and not within, the two groups. Feldstein (1973) also used a CES
social welfare function to compute optimal taxes but in his study, there were
ﬁxed shares of skill groups and all individuals had the same utility within
their skill group. I evaluate equation (4.28) for tax rates between −99%
and 95%23 using Matlab. The inclusion of negative tax rates allows for the
possibility that the optimal policy may be to subsidize labor and ﬁnance it
by negative lump-sum transfers. I used the same values on the egalitarian
preference parameter ψ as Feldstein (1973). The rest of the parameter values
are the same as in Section 4.1. For the case with no education subsidies, that
is S = 0, the results for each value of ψ are summarized in table 5 below.
Table 5: Optimal tax rates and transfers.
ψ 1 0.5 0.01 −1 −10 −50
t(%) 1.56 1.63 1.69 1.84 3.15 7.59
T 0.0019 0.0020 0.0020 0.0022 0.0038 0.0087
As can be seen from table 5, the optimal tax rates are remarkably low for all
values of ψ, compared to for example Feldstein (1973). The reason is that
the utility for unskilled workers peaks already at t = 0.11, given the chosen
parameter values, whereas that for skilled workers decreases monotonically
with the tax rate for all values of t.
22The average utility for the skilled group follows from linearity of the cost function.
See ﬁgure 1 for a graphic interpretation.
23For t = −1 and t ∈ (0,95,1], there are values of t for which there does not seem to
exist any real solution to the system of equations.
27In the case where not only the tax and transfer system but also education
subsidies are in the policy maker’s possession, the optimal policy mix is cal-
culated combining t ∈ [−0.99,0.45] and S ∈ [−0.2,0.2]24. The results for
each value of ψ are summarized in table 6 below.
Table 6: Optimal tax rates, transfers and subsidies.
ψ 1 0.5 0.01 −1 −10 −50
t(%) 0.1 -0.1 0 0 0.1 0
S -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.017 -0.033
T 0.0042 0.0043 0.0045 0.0049 0.0073 0.0121
As can be seen from table 6, the optimal tax rates are practically zero in
the case when also education subsidies can be used since in this case, the
government possesses two lump-sum instruments. Thus, it can redistribute
money by collecting money through a negative education subsidy and spend-
ing money by a positive general transfer. This was not possible in the case
without the education subsidy. The table also shows that the negative educa-
tion subsidy decreases with the desire for equity, represented by a lower value
of ψ. As this lump-sum transfer from the educated individuals increases, so
does the general transfer that beneﬁts the unskilled workers.
24The values are restricted for the same reason as in note 21.
285 Discussion and conclusions
This paper has investigated the eﬀects of a linear income tax and education
subsidies on wages, labor supplies, transfers, the share of skilled workers and
utility levels. It was shown that endogenizing wages and the share of skilled
and unskilled workers may aﬀect each other diﬀerently and also introduces
additional channels of interdependencies to other important economic vari-
ables. The main result of the paper was that, contrary to Feldstein (1973),
general equilibrium eﬀects on wages may counteract ﬁscal redistribution when
the share of skilled and unskilled workers is endogenous. It was also shown
that 1) introducing education subsidies tends to wage convergence and recu-
perates some incentives to higher education that may otherwise be weakened
by redistribution, 2) education subsidies can be viewed as a transfer from
unskilled to skilled workers and the resulting wage compression is not suﬃ-
cient to make unskilled workers better oﬀ and 3) the optimal policy mix may
include negative subsidies and a low (or zero) income tax.
The model used is necessarily simple and abstracts from almost all hetero-
geneity in individuals’ preferences, characteristics and behavior. Neverthe-
less, a few policy relevant arguments could be advanced. First, redistribution
may be counteracted by diverging wages between unskilled and skilled work-
ers. However, the adjustment to the new equilibrium may be faster regarding
individuals’ labor supply than for the share of educated workers. This is be-
cause, in principle, all individuals can immediately adjust their labor supply,
whereas the stock of educated people adjusts slowly due to the fact that a
large share of it has already chosen which type of worker to become. There-
fore, in the short run, the wage converging eﬀect of diﬀerent labor supply
responses to a tax change may reinforce redistribution by wage convergence
while in the long run, redistribution is counteracted by wage divergence.
Second, education subsidies may merely work as a redistribution from un-
skilled to skilled workers. Thus, with distortive taxation, a government with
redistributive ambitions may do better by having relatively modest (or no)
29general education subsidies, taxes and transfers than by implementing rela-
tively high taxes, transfers and subsidies. Naturally, in the view of imperfect
capital markets, there may still be good reasons for the government to direct
education subsidies to disadvantaged individuals or give them advantageous
loan conditions. However, if the share of skilled workers has a positive exter-
nality eﬀect on the growth rate of the economy, such as suggested by parts
of the endogenous growth literature, general education subsidies may beneﬁt
both skilled and unskilled workers in the long run.
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31Appendix
Consumption for skilled workers is now assumed to be
CX
s = (1−t)wsLX
s +T +S−θX. Consumption diﬀers among skilled workers
and the labor supply will consequently also diﬀer among these workers. Let
the labor supply for the indiﬀerent individual be denoted Lx
s and that for the
one with highest ability be L0
s. The corresponding utilities are Ux
s and U0
s,
respectively.The total labor supply of skilled workers is Ls. The following
benchmark is now assumed:
Uu =[φ(1 − t)wuLu + T)
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32The second equality in equation (5.6) shows the average labor supply of
skilled workers to be just the average of Lx
s and L0. This stems from the
fact that with a CES utility function, labor supply is proportional to the
education cost. Using the same parameter values as in the simulations in
Section 4, the results in table 7 and 8 were obtained. As can be seen, the
main results are qualitatively the same as in Section 4.
Table 7: Government policy, wage rates and labor supplies
t S wu ws Lu L0
s Lx
s Ls
0 0 0.395680 0.604379 0.157564 0.182356 0.239973 0.0889048
0.1 0 0.383750 0.617120 0.131117 0.165750 0.222420 0.0734817
0.1 0.003 0.388516 0.611912 0.134568 0.162207 0.221781 0.0757906
Table 8: Government policy, transfer size, share of skilled work-
ers and utilities
t S T x Uu Ux
s U0
s
0 0 0 0.420199 0.476366 0.476366 0.511960
0.1 0 0.00766491 0.377895 0.476864 0.476864 0.511170
0.1 0.003 0.00662380 0.394023 0.476231 0.476231 0.512251
33